SIGMA Futures
Indo-Pacific · Cross-strait · 12-month forecast

China–Taiwan

Probability of conflict between China and Taiwan, with the United States as material third party
84%
below the threshold of combat
16%
kinetic risk over the horizon
3
81
12
4
threshold of combat
Negotiated settlement 3%
No kinetic resolution 81%
Limited military action 12%
Major operation 4%
Two non-kinetic outcomes
Settled — the dispute is formally resolved3%
Unresolved — no combat, no settlement81%
Both remain below the threshold of combat. They differ in whether the dispute is resolved or simply remains open.

An 84% chance the coming year stays below the threshold of combat — and a danger that is a low year, not a low decade.

The committed forecast
On the record COMMITTED
ledger idCHN-TWN · 2026-05
committed2026-05-30
resolves2027-05-31
horizon12 months
frameworkSIGMA
confidencemoderate · ±8 pts
Resolution. Scored at horizon against the realised outcome — no kinetic conflict, a limited action, or a major operation — and logged to the append-only ledger.
Cite this forecast
SIGMA Futures Group assesses an 84% probability of no kinetic China–Taiwan conflict in the twelve months to 31 May 2027, with a 12% limited-action and 4% full-invasion tail.
SIGMA Forecast Ledger · CHN-TWN · 2026-05

This decomposition reflects SIGMA's published judgement as of the assessed date. It is a committed, point-in-time position rather than a live figure; ongoing working analysis is available to members.

Forecast evolution record building
No kinetic resolution Negotiated settlement Limited military action Major operation
Four-way outcome probability at each committed vintage. Nodes are the assessments; connecting lines are indicative only.
Strategic timeline
Historical
  1. 1949The Chinese Civil War ends and the Republic of China government relocates to Taiwan.
  2. 1950The United States deploys the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait.
  3. 1954–55First Taiwan Strait Crisis; PRC forces shell Republic of China-controlled offshore islands.
  4. 1958Second Taiwan Strait Crisis; PRC forces bombard the islands of Kinmen and Matsu.
  5. 1971The United Nations transfers China's seat from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China.
  6. 1979The United States switches diplomatic recognition to Beijing and passes the Taiwan Relations Act.
  7. 1996Third Taiwan Strait Crisis; PRC missile tests near Taiwan draw two U.S. carrier groups.
  8. 2005The People's Republic of China enacts the Anti-Secession Law.
  9. 2022Large-scale PLA exercises encircle Taiwan following a senior U.S. congressional visit.
Recent developments
  1. Throughout 2024The People's Republic of China conducts large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.
  2. Early 2025The People's Republic of China increases gray-zone air and maritime incursions around the Taiwan Strait.
  3. Mid-2025Taiwan expands its United States arms procurement and enacts domestic defence reforms.
  4. Late 2025The People's Republic of China and Russia conduct joint naval and air drills in the Western Pacific.

Curated for strategic significance, not completeness. The timeline provides context; the Foundation Paper explains the assessment.

From the Foundation Paper
Satellite image of Taiwan: shallow strait to the west, mountainous island, deep Pacific to the east
Figure 1 — Taiwan and its waters.
The Theatre
A hundred miles of water

Geography is one of the governing constraints on military operations across the Taiwan Strait. Roughly a hundred miles of open water separate the island from the mainland: wide enough that a crossing is a major undertaking, narrow enough that the strait is one of the most heavily trafficked and contested spaces on earth. The same waters that carry much of the world’s trade also make the island so difficult to take by force.

The strait does not constrain every form of military power equally. Any attempt to seize the island would likely combine long-range strikes, cyber operations, unmanned systems, air assault forces and amphibious formations in a tightly integrated campaign. Yet each addresses only part of the operational challenge. Geography does not prevent military effects from reaching Taiwan; it is the movement, sustainment and expansion of forces ashore that remain the decisive challenge. An amphibious assault would still have to cross that hundred miles during limited periods of favourable weather, secure one of the island’s few suitable landing areas — long prepared for exactly that contingency — and then fight inland across increasingly restrictive terrain. Taken together, these constraints are among the principal reasons a full invasion remains the least likely outcome.

Intended use

A calibrated read of one question — to be weighed against your own judgement. SIGMA is designed for decisions where understanding the strategic context matters more than following daily headlines.

Members

The reasoning behind the forecast.

The Foundation Paper sets out the complete analytical case behind this assessment — the strategic dynamics, the incentives, the competing pathways, and the calibration.

Members

The reasoning behind the forecast.

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